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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:09 pm
Time: 10:09 pm
Results for military forces
2 results foundAuthor: Moyano, Inigo Guevara Title: Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire: The Mexican Military 2006-11 Summary: Mexico’s armed forces are in the midst of a transformation to better perform in an ongoing war against organized crime. Their role and visibility have escalated considerably since President Felipe Calderon assumed office in December of 2006. Although the fight against organized crime is clearly a law enforcement matter, the absence of effective and accountable police forces has meant that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been used as supplementary forces to defend the civilian population and enforce the rule of law. While the federal government has striven to stand up a capable police force in order to relieve and eventually replace the military, that possibility is still distant. Five years into the Calderon administration, the armed forces continue to be the main implementers of the National Security policy, aimed at employing the use of force to disrupt the operational capacity of organized crime. Their strong institutional tradition, professionalism, submission to political control, and history of interaction with the population mainly through disaster relief efforts have made them the most trusted institution in Mexican society. Mexico’s armed forces have long been used as an instrument of the state to implement all kinds of public policies at the national level, from emergency vaccinations, to post-earthquake rescue, to reforestation campaigns. They have been at the forefront of disaster relief operations in reaction to the calamities of nature, within and beyond their borders, with humanitarian assistance deployments to Indonesia, the United States, Haiti, and Central America among the most recent. The Mexican armed forces are quite unique, as they are divided into two separate cabinet-level ministries: the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretary of National Defense or SEDENA), which encompasses the Army and Air Force, and the Secretaría de Marina (the Secretary of the Navy or SEMAR), which comprises the Navy. The level of engagement with society and the results obtained from this division in military power confirms the utility of their independence. Their use as the state’s last line of defense has led to severe criticism from opinion leaders, opposition forces, international analysts, and human rights organizations. Their level of commitment remains unaltered and they have undertaken a number of significant transformations to better address their continued roles as the guardians of the State and protectors of the population. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Letort Paper: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1081.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1081.pdf Shelf Number: 122957 Keywords: Armed ForcesMilitary ForcesOrganized Crime (Mexico)ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Marques, Paul R. Title: Assessing the Ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs to Support the Afghan Local Police Summary: RAND researchers assess the ability of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) to support the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program; evaluate the range of logistics, personnel management, and training activities essential to the success of ALP's local security mission; and identify lessons from support to the program that might prove useful when undertaking similar efforts to help build local security forces in the future. This analysis relies primarily on interviews conducted in Afghanistan in 2013 and 2015 with Coalition and Afghan officials involved in the ALP program. To a lesser extent, the analysis draws on quantitative logistics and personnel reporting. While some MOI and Coalition initiatives have fared better than others and some are still a work in progress, our research shows some positive results - in the form of recruits processed and vetted, equipment received, forces paid, and candidates trained - with limited Coalition assistance since the end of 2014. However, examples of improved capabilities do not yet equate to an institutional commitment and capacity to sustain the ALP program. Still, for future U.S. government efforts to assist foreign partners in building the capacity of their local security forces, there are important insights that can be derived from the experience of transitioning ALP to full Afghan control. Key Findings Logistics, Personnel Management, and Training Activities Have Progressed but Still Need Work - With Coalition assistance, MOI has made strides to improve its logistics practices and results. The Coalition's 2012 initiative to eliminate bottlenecks when providing ALP with initial equipment was mostly successful. Since the transition of the program to full Afghan control in 2014, the Coalition's ability to assess ALP's logistic situation has been significantly curtailed. Available information indicates that some ALP districts are receiving adequate levels of supplies while others face substantial shortages. More needs to be done if the Afghans are to acquire sufficient capacity to requisition, track, store, transport, distribute, and maintain necessary quantities of ALP equipment and supplies. - Afghans have begun to acquire and demonstrate many of the capabilities necessary to successfully manage ALP personnel. For example, Afghan elders, government officials, and contractors are currently handling all ALP recruiting, vetting, and in-processing tasks with no assistance from the Coalition. Despite these hopeful signs, the deteriorating security situation in parts of Afghanistan has contributed to the development of local militia groups, some of which use the ALP banner but do not follow the rigorous personnel management procedures that are the hallmark of the ALP program. - The state of ALP training is good compared with the situation in the rest of the Afghan police force. As of early 2015, approximately 86 percent of the ALP force had attended a formal training course. Nevertheless, there are still security and logistics concerns in transporting ALP guardians to regional training centers. Thus, many Coalition advisers we spoke to agreed that a hybrid training system -- with local and regional aspects -- was the best option for the future. Recommendations - Advisers must take account of the operating environment and work in concert with various partners. U.S. advisers must do their best to first understand the lay of the land and then recommend a support plan that either circumvents or erodes potential blockages. - Pull-based logistics systems often take a long time to evolve; therefore, rather than attempting to make the immediate leap to a first-tier, pull-based stock replenishment system, donors should consider simpler alternatives that account for the partner's level of resources, literacy, technical competence, communications, and data availability, and then transition to a mature pull-based system at an appropriate pace. - Managing dispersed forces requires a balance between local autonomy and central oversight. Advisers and host-nation officials need to find a balance between encouraging local leaders to take charge of the daily management of local security forces and ensuring that the former raise and employ the latter appropriately and continue to provide adequate support to them. - Centralized training has advantages, but a hybrid system may work best over the long term. To accomplish this, advisers should perform a comprehensive assessment of the training needs of all of the elements of the police force and, along with host-nation officials, develop training plans that employ a combination of regional training centers, local training venues, and mobile training teams. - If politically feasible, a multi-level coalition advisory structure should be maintained until the host nation has an assured sustainment capability. This would permit coalition advisers to continue to work with headquarters officials and local leaders on resolving management issues pertaining to the police and military. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1399/RAND_RR1399.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1300/RR1399/RAND_RR1399.pdf Shelf Number: 140061 Keywords: Military ForcesPolice Education and TrainingPolicing |